follow the prejudice test have not been reluctant to grant new trials. 6 But in the majority of situations, the evidence has indicated an absence of influence on the jury or prejudice against the defendant; and the courts have denied motions for new trials on that basis. Thus the courts have refused to grant new trials where the judge asked that he be notified if the jury should agree ;7 where no additional information was given that was not in the original charge ;8 where upon inquiry as to whether the jury could return a decision of life imprisonment "and not eligible for parole," and the judge answered no ;9 where, questioned as to the form of verdict, the judge answered, "guilty or not guilty";1O where the trial judge, when asked the meaning of a word, told the juror that a reference to the dictionary might throw some light on it;" where the jury asked whether a type of verdict was permissible, and the judge replied that he would have to send for the defendant in order to answer ;12 where the jury asked whether they could write a recommendation for clemency and the judge replied that they could.'
3
In conflict with the prejudice rule as set forth in the Brothers case, a number of jurisdictions follow a more strict rationale which requires a new trial in the instance of any communication whatever between the judge and jury, except that which takes place in open court with the defendant present.
14 The proponents of this view feel that the question should not be in terms of the substance and effect of each particular communication, but, whether any communication at all is proper. This rationale is followed in a substantial number of states regardless of the innocence of the communication.
15
Prior to the Brothers case, Illinois had consistently followed the strict rule, 8 But the court rejected the rule on the ground that it would be "idle" to disturb the verdict where no prejudice could have resulted.
19
The policy underlying the strict rule is to guarantee the defendant his right to a public trial-the right to be present at every stage of the proceedings.
0
It is argued that private communications, however harmless, may open the door to abuses and destroy the confidence of the accused and of the public in the fairness of the trial. 21 The remarks of the judge may be insignificant, but something about his manner and actions could indicate approval, disappointment or contempt, adversely affecting the defendant's cause.
22 Furthermore, since the defendant is not present when the communication occurs, it may be extremely difficult for him to establish prejudice, particularly because a juror may not impeach his own verdict. On the other hand, the policy underlying the more liberal rule, requiring a showing of prejudice, is to prevent repetitious litigation after defendant has had a full and complete trial. It is argued that harmless errors and procedural technicalities should not be grounds for new trials. As a practical matter, it is often impossible to prevent a juror from communicating with a trial judge, as when the judge enters the jury room for some purpose other than to communicate with the jury, 25 or when a juror approaches the judge to ask permission to telephone or to report he is i]1.26 Thus, it would seem that no matter which rule is followed, extraneous communications may continue to occur.
The 2 7 Therefore, it would seem that the liberal rule adequately safeguards defendant's rights, and, at the same time, avoids the problems of repetitious litigation in cases where he has already had a fair trial.
The constitutionality of the liberal rule will be determined by the United States Supreme Court when it hears the T¢ltey case on certiorari.
28 Although the Supreme Court has not been faced with an extraneous communications problem of this nature before, 29 the lower federal courts have met it in several cases and have adopted a rule which differs slightly from both the strict and liberal views expressed above. The federal courts hold that communicatios between the court and jury constitute error if the defendant was not present when the communication occurred, but if the record shows affirmatively that the defendant was not prejudiced by the communication, then the error does not require reversal.
30 If the record shows the error but does not disclose whether it was or was not prejudicial, it is presumed to have been prejudicial.
31
This rule seems to have developed "upon general constitutional grounds" and as a variation of the strict rule followed in many states. 32 Even assuming that the federal courts adopted their rule upon constitutional grounds alone, it will not necessarily follow that the states will be denied the choice of adopting a more liberal rule without violating the constitutional guarantees. In the past, the Court has adopted a strict rule for its own procedure but left the states free to adopt less strict measures in analogous situations, e.g., the right to counsel, 33 the admission of evidence illegally seized, 3 4 and the privilege against self-incrimination.
35
The Supreme Court must decide in the Ti¢ley case whether the liberal rule applied in a state court amounts to a denial of procedural due process under the federal constitution. Although the Court has specifically held that many of the specific safeguards guaranteed a defendant in a criminal trial in the federal courts by the Bill of Rights 36 have not been extended to the state courts by the Fourteenth Amendment nevertheless certain procedures in 27. There are no discovered cases where such a claim has even been asserted. However, it may well be said that the absence of cases may be in part accounted for by the absence of proof. 32. The cases speak of defendant's "rights" or "constitutional rights," but are not specific as to the exact constitutional guarantee in question. However, in Fina v. United States, 46 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1 931) the court held specifically that the communication involved (the court answered a question propounded by the jury in the defendant's absence) violated defendant's right to be present at all stages of the trial and of the right to a fair and impartial trial. 
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